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Abstract 
We consider a model of vertically related market between upstream monopolistic innovator and downstream 
oligopolistic firms where polluting firms may purchase a license of pollution abatement technology from an 
upstream innovator. When the government imposes an emission tax on polluting industry, polluting firms are faced 
with the choice of getting an abatement technology license or not. We compare royalty licensing contract and two-
part tariff licensing contract, where fixed-fee for licensing and royalty for purchasing a clean technology are 
included, and examine the welfare-improving case where the licensing of environmental patent can reduce 
pollution.  
The followings are the main findings of our analysis. Under royalty licensing contract with low emission tax, all 
polluting firms will not buy clean technology while they will purchase it if the government imposes sufficiently 
high emission tax. However, both innovator’s profit and social welfare will increase under two-part tariff licensing 
contract. Thus, two-part tariff licensing contract can induce polluting downstream firms to purchase a clean 
technology and improve social welfare, even though the two-part tariff licensing contract is not always socially 
desirable. 
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1.  Introduction 
Recently, interest in environment technology is rising with the expansion of the climate changes and 
green growth trend. Environmental technology comprises a large proportion of innovations. And many 
studies of technology are concerned with cost reducing innovation and R&D. Similarly, the significant 
part of environmental R&D for clean technology has a form of pollution abatement technology which 
is reducing the levels of emission. Most abatement technologies are likely to be patented or marketable. 
Thus, the market for abatement equipment would be characterized by oligopolistic behavior.( [1] 
Greaker and Rosendahl).  
The basic framework for environmental taxation on environmental firms in eco-industry was first 
introduced by [2] David and Sinclair-Desgagne. They showed that the market power of the eco-
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industry would bring about a higher pollution tax than the marginal social cost of damage. [3] Kamien 
and Tauman presents that with outside innovation, fixed fee policy is superior to royalty policy in an 
homogenous-product oligopoly. [4] Sen and Tauman show that licensing under combinations of 
upfront fees and royalties unambiguously leads to improvement of social welfare in an oligopoly.  
This article considers the eco-industry and its effect on environmental regulation under vertical 
oligopolies with two industries, the upstream industry that produces abatement goods and the 
downstream industry that produces consumption goods emitting pollutants, regulated by an 
environmental tax. [5] Canton, et. al. considered the second-best tax and [6] Lee and Park examined 
policy combinations of two-part environmental tax. We will analyze the market behaviors of polluting 
firms and the upstream monopolistic innovator with clean technology.  
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 constructs the basic model for the vertical 
structure, consisting of polluting firms in the downstream industry and environmental firms in the 
upstream industry. Then, analyses two patent licensing contracts: royalty and two-part licensing. In 
Section 3, we analyze the optimal behaviors of the innovator that maximizes social welfare under two 
patent licensing contracts. Section 4 briefly discusses the optimal environmental tax level, which can 
increase the welfare for controlling the market power between the eco-industry and the polluting 
industry in the vertical structure. The final section provides a conclusion. 
2. The Basic Model 
2.1 The Model 
We consider a vertically related market where upstream monopolistic innovator produces pollution 
abatement goods with patent and n downstream firms produce a homogenous good in Cournot 
competition. We assume that downstream firms emit pollution to produce the final goods. So, the 
regulator imposes emission tax to the emission levels of downstream polluting firms to reduce 
pollutions. The monopolistic innovator would like to license the clean technology to downstream firms 
and contract a royalty licensing or two-part tariff licensing. The innovator will only license to k out of 
the n firms. The licensed firms can reduce the emission tax expenditure by using clean technology. For 
simplicity, we assume the production cost of downstream firms and an upstream innovator is zero.  
The inverse demand function for the final goods is , where ¦¦   ڮۄ کۄڮۄ ڧۄ ییڬ  is the 
quantity of the final goods , is the output supplied by the licensees (non-licensees), and S 
represents the set of licensees. We assume that this clean technology is characterized by diminishing 
marginal product; convex emission function, i.e,  and  where  is the amount 
of clean technology. Also, it is assumed that , , and . The emission 
function of the licensees can be defined as  by [5] David, M. Sinclair-Desgagne. 
The model consists of a three stage-game. In the first stage, the regulator announces emission tax t . 
In the second stage, given t , an upstream innovator introduces technology and decides whether royalty 
licensing scheme or two part tariff licensing scheme. After deciding scheme, the upstream innovator 
announces clean technology price(royalty) or fixed fee f . In the third stage, given r or , 
downstream firms (polluting firms) simultaneously decide whether or not to purchase a license. At that 
time the numbers of patents are determined in market. Then, downstream firms choose their optimal 
level of N
i
L
i qq ,  and ia  in Cournot fashion. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this three stage-game is 
derived by backward induction. 
2.2 Royalty Licensing  
In royalty licensing contract, given emission tax, the monopolistic innovator sets royalty, r , and 
determines k  number of licensees. Then, given clean technology price r , downstream firms 
simultaneously decide whether or not to purchase a license and produce final goods in Cournot 
competition. The profit functions for a licensed firm, LiS , and a non-licensed firm, NiS , are as follows: 
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Assuming interior solutions, licensed firms decide the optimal level of output Liq and the amount of 
clean technology ia . The first-order conditions for profit maximization for a licensed firm are as 
follows: 
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Non-licensed firms decide the optimal level of output, Niq . The first-order conditions for profit 
maximization for a non- licensed firm are as follows: 
0  w
w ¦¦ 

N
i
N
i
kn
Si
N
i
k
Si
L
iN
i
N
i tqqqqA
q
S        (5) 
Solving these first-order conditions simultaneously, we can derive the equilibrium outputs and the 
amount of clean technology as follows: 
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In the second stage, given the aggregate derived demand, monopolistic innovator determines the 
royalty of clean technology and the number of licenses to maximize its profit. For simplicity, we 
assume that the innovator firm’s cost is zero. The profit function of upstream firm is as follows:  
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From first-order conditions1, the royalty, the price of clean technology, is 
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 and the 
number of licenses is n because the innovator’s profit increases in more licensing firms. Therefore, the 
monopolistic innovator would like to see a patent to all downstream firms. Specifically, we should 
doubt whether there exists nk 0  on where the profit of licensed firm equals that of non-licensed 
firm. As a result, we can drive the k  when both individual profits are the same: 
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 . Then, however, we couldn’t obtain the interior 
solutions for the amount of clean technology at the supposed equilibrium, and thus there does not exist 
any equilibrium on k  licenses. In sum, under royalty licensing contract, there is not inner optimal k  
where nk 0  so we examine two cases: 0 k  and nk  .  
First, consider a case of nk   which is all downstream firms buy the clean technology. Given the 
amount of clean technology, ia , upstream innovator maximize its profits with respect to .r  Then, we 
can derive the price of royalty, 
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Next, in the first stage, the regulator determines emission tax and maximizes the welfare function. 
We suppose that emission tax is given. Then, we here analyze the welfare effects of royalty licensing 
under the condition of nk  . Let 2** )(
2
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L
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nED  denote the environmental damages from 
 
1 The first-order conditions for profit maximization for monopolistic innovator are as follows: 
0 w
w w
w
r
arkka
r
i
i
MS           (7) 
0!w
w w
w
k
arkra
k
i
i
MS  → 01 ! tn  → 0!w
w
k
MS  ി nk  .    (8) 
98   Seung-Leul Kim et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  57 ( 2012 )  95 – 101 
pollution, where 0)(' !ED  , 0)(" tED  and ineE  . Then, the welfare function is as follows: 
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Next, consider another case of 0 k . When all downstream firms do not buy the clean technology, 
upstream innovator’s profits is zero. We denotes Niq as the non-licensed firm i ’s output when 0 k . 
Then, from F.O.C, we can derive   
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  Finally, we can derive the following welfare function: 
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we find that the condition of polluting firms which buy clean technology depends on emission tax. It is 
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Proposition 1. Under royalty licensing contract with low emission tax, all polluting firms will not 
buy clean technology while they will purchase it if the government imposes sufficiently high emission 
tax. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Comparison of profits  for ڌڋڋ ڜ and ڎ ۉ . 
 
 
We analyze the behaviors of downstream firms by simulation for ڌڋڋ ڜ  and ڎ ۉ . The fig. 1. 
shows that all polluting firms will buy clean technologies if government charges sufficiently high tax, 
څۏۏ ! . Otherwise they are not. Therefore, it is not easy to attain the equilibrium that all polluting firms 
use abatement good.   
 
2.3Two-PartTariff Licensing 
In this section, we consider two-part tariff licensing contract. The game consists of a four stage-
game. In the first stage, the regulator announces emission tax t . In the second stage, given t , an 
upstream innovator introduces technology and announces fixed-fee f . Then, downstream firms 
(polluting firms) simultaneously decide whether purchase a license or not. Downstream firms should 
pay fixed fee to use the technology. We assume here that the upstream innovator gives the patent to 
only k  firms. Thus, the innovator intends to maximize his profits by restricting the number of licenses. 
99 Seung-Leul Kim et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  57 ( 2012 )  95 – 101 
In the third stage, the innovator announces the price of clean technology. Then, finally, downstream 
firms choose their optimal level of Ni
L
i qq ,  and ia  in Cournot fashion. [7] [8] 
In the fourth stage, given r  and f , k  licensed firms and kn  non-licensed firms produce a 
homogenous good in Cournot competition. Polluting downstream firms the profit functions for a 
licensed firm, LiS , and a non-licensed firm, NiS , are as follows: 
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Let f denote fixed fee. Thus, the first order conditions are the same as royalty licensing case.  
We can derive 
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In the third stage, given the aggregate derived demand of clean technology, the innovator determines 
the price of clean technology. For simplicity, we assume that the production cost function of upstream 
innovator is zero. The profit function of upstream firm is as follows: 
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Next, in the second stage, given 
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from the third stage, the licensing fixed fee can be 
derived. The optimal licensing fee is equal to the profit difference of each licensee between accepting 
and rejecting the licensing offer, that is, )1()( d kkf NiLi SS . We briefly mention this condition that 
downstream firms will accept the fixed fee by offered from an innovator when the profit of downstream 
firms with license is more than that of non-licensees despite of paying the fixed fee.     
We can calculate the fixed fee as follows but it is complicated. So we check the sign of f by 
simulation and know that f is positive. 
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Given the monopolistic innovator has all bargaining power, the profit maximization problem of 
innovator is as follows: )]1()([max  kkk NL
k
SS      (14) 
Therefore, there exists k where maximize the upstream innovator’s profit (appendix A). We get k  
which is too complicated. Therefore, we will derive other equilibrium solutions by simulation. Formally, 
the profit function of the innovator is as follows:  
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Next, in the first stage, the regulator determines emission tax and maximizes the welfare function. 
We suppose that emission tax is given. Then, the welfare function is as follows:  
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Proposition 2. Under emission tax regulation, the monopolistic innovator prefers two- part tariff 
licensing to royalty licensing over specific ranges of emission tax. In other words, the licensing 
contract which is preferred by the innovator depends on emission tax.  
 
We simulated the profit functions of innovator and downstream firms with ڌڋڋ ڜ and ڎ ۉ . 
Fig. 2 presents that the monopolistic innovator chooses two-part tariff licensing contract if emission tax 
is less than the point t. If emission tax is bigger than point t, the innovator prefers royalty licensing to 
two-part tariff licensing 
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Fig. 2. Innovator’s profits and for ڌڋڋ ڜ  and ڎ ۉ . 
 
3. Welfare Comparison of Two Licensing Schemes 
In this section, we analyse the behaviours of the innovator and compare royalty licensing and two-
part tariff licensing. To examine these two licensing contracts, we analyse it by simulation which is 
assumed ڌڋڋ ڜ  and ڎ ۉ . Figure 3 below shows that it is socially desirable that the innovator 
chooses two-part tariff licensing between *t and څڅۏ . On the other hand, if emission tax, t , is bigger 
than څڅۏ , it is not socially desirable that the innovator chooses two-part tariff licensing. However, if 
emission tax is over څڅۏ , it is desirable for royalty licensing to improve social welfares. Therefore, we 
find that the licensing contract which is selected by the innovator with clean technology depends on the 
levels of emission tax.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Welfare comparison of two-part tariff and royalty licensing for ڌڋڋ ڜ  and ڎ ۉ . 
4. Discussion on Optimal Environmental Tax 
In this section, we will briefly discuss the optimal environmental tax level depends on the market 
power between the eco-industry and the polluting industry in the vertical structure. In practice or in the 
real markets under imperfect competition, barriers to entry are not too sufficiently high to justify 
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treating the number of firms in an industry as fixed. For example, if there is a big incentive in a market 
or political powers to remove barriers to entry prevail so that entry into the market cannot be 
controllable then a large number of entrants can exist. The economic players who have limited power 
in the market could attempt to decide entry into an industry and to find another optimal behavior. i.e., 
the regulator should decide whether permitting another entry or not and the producers should decide 
whether they change their output level or not. In the future study, we will consider the market structure 
where the decision to enter to or exit from the market is determined by the producer’s optimal 
behaviors. And we will calculate the change of the numbers of upstream or downstream firms, which 
affect the amount of abatement goods consumed by downstream, the price of abatement goods, and the 
strategy of patent licensing pattern. 
Furthermore, using several regulatory instruments cannot be used at once, in reality, because the 
regulator may have insufficient power to control the market or the regulation cost is too high. Then the 
regulator must use less regulations or single regulation. If the number of firms is allowed to vary and 
the regulator doesn’t have sufficient instruments, then the regulator cannot directly control the number 
of firms. i.e., having only environmental taxation without entry regulation instruments, the regulator 
cannot affect upstream or downstream firms’ entry decision but can affect their output level. So the 
regulator will have to take into account the effect of the environmental tax on the entry decision of 
firms in choosing the tax level when the regulator can only single regulation of environmental taxation; 
which is the second-best problem. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We consider a vertically related market where upstream monopolistic outside-innovator produces 
pollution abatement goods with patent and n downstream firms produce a homogenous good in Cournot 
competition. Under royalty licensing contract with low emission tax, all polluting firms will not buy 
clean technology while they will purchase it if the government imposes extremely high emission tax. 
Increasing emission tax will lead to increase the output price of downstream, and increasing demand of 
clean technology increases the price of licensing royalty and fixed-fee. Thus, both innovator’s profit 
and social welfare will increase under two-part tariff licensing contract. Finally, two-part tariff licensing 
contract can induce polluting downstream firms to license an innovation and improve social welfare, 
even though the two-part tariff licensing contract is not always socially desirable.  
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